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Construction Moratorium as a Taking 
Monks v City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 
167 CA4th 263, 84 CR3d 75 
Moratorium on building homes in landslide area was permanent taking not justified by nuisance 
principles. 
Plaintiffs were prevented from building homes on their 16 lots by a moratorium enacted by the 
City of Palos Verdes and a new administrative process for exclusion from the moratorium. The 
court of appeal concluded that the city’s moratorium effected a permanent taking of the 
properties, reversed the trial court, and remanded for determination of an appropriate remedy.  
Part of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes sits on an ancient landslide. Residential development 
in the area had begun when, in August 1957, the Portuguese Bend landslide occurred east and 
southeast of plaintiffs’ lots. In 1974–1976, the area known as the Abalone Cove landslide, south 
and southwest of plaintiffs’ lots, began to move. These areas remain active. In 1978, the city 
imposed a moratorium on building new homes on over 1000 acres identified by a Landslide 
Moratorium Map, later divided into eight zones of various sizes. Zone 2, about 130 acres, where 
plaintiffs’ lots are located, was unaffected by the land movement and remains quiet.  
In June 2002, while the plaintiffs’ application for exclusion from the moratorium was pending, 
the city approved Resolution No. 2002–43, which stated that a consultant’s conclusion that there 
could be development without destabilization was in error and instituted, as a precondition of 
construction, owner demonstration of a safety factor of no less than 1.5 in a zone, as a whole. All 
prior consultant reports had concluded that Zone 2 as a whole had a safety factor of less than 1.5. 
In March 1996, the city geologist had reported the Zone 2 factor as greater than 1.25 and less than 
1.5.  
Plaintiffs then sued to overturn Resolution No. 2002–43, alleging inverse condemnation in 
violation of the takings clause (Cal Const art, I §19). The trial court denied the request to submit 
additional evidence and denied the writ based on the administrative record. The court of appeal 
reversed and remanded for a trial on the takings claim. The trial court found that the city acted 
properly in imposing and, in effect, continuing the moratorium and entered judgment for the city. 
On the second appeal, the court of appeal concluded that “the resolution, by implementing the 
moratorium and continuing to prevent plaintiffs from building on their properties, deprived 
plaintiffs’ land of all economically beneficial use.” See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 
(1992) 505 US 1003, 1027, 120 L Ed 2d 798, 820, 112 S Ct 2886. Therefore, the city had the 
burden to prove that the moratorium was justified under the state’s law of property and nuisance. 
505 US at 1029, 120 L Ed 2d at 820.  
In its statement of decision, the trial court concluded that “at best there remains uncertainty 
with respect to the stability of the geology of Zone 2.” The trial court expressly noted that 
litigation, after the Portuguese Bend and Abalone Cove landslides, had required “large sums” for 
the city to resolve. The trial court stated: “A public entity is not required to risk bankruptcy in 
order to satisfy the unsubstantiated beliefs of property owners that development is safe in an area 
with less than geotechnically acceptable measurements.” The trial court deemed the risk of land 
movement, however minor, to be a public nuisance. Therefore, the moratorium did not exceed 
reasonable regulation in light of its important purpose, negligible effect on permitted uses, and 
lack of interference with the reasonable expectations of the plaintiffs, who, after all, could seek to 
be excluded. 
The court of appeal found the conclusion regarding exclusion from the moratorium contrary to 
the law of the case and the conclusion regarding the significance of land movement not supported 
by substantial evidence. The Lucas court established a four-part test:  
1. Removal of all economically beneficial use was a taking. 505 US at 1019, 120 L Ed 2d at 
815.  
2. Such a severe limitation could not be “newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation).” 505 US at 1029, 120 L Ed 2d at 821.  
3. A use long engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily implies lack of any 
common-law impediment. 505 US at 1030, 120 L Ed 2d at 822.  
4. The government bears the burden of proof that the intended use is not allowed under state 
law of property and nuisance. 505 US at 1031, 120 L Ed 2d at 823. 
To constitute a public or private nuisance, the interference must be both substantial and 
unreasonable by an objective measure. The city did not produce substantial evidence of such an 
interference. There is nothing inherently harmful about homebuilding, especially in an area zoned 
for that purpose and provided with the necessary utilities. Moreover, the “uncertainty” found by 
the trial court was not a sufficient basis on which to deprive the landowner of a home. There must 
be, instead, a reasonable probability of significant harm. The city’s expert witness agreed that 
there was no need to evacuate existing homes in Zone 2 because there was no significant risk of 
harm to anyone living there. Rather, the overwhelming evidence was that development, along 
with dewatering wells, would improve the stability of the land. Further, the city approved so 
many exemption permits for existing homes as to make application of the moratorium to plaintiffs 
questionable. Finally, speculation that the city might “risk bankruptcy” does not justify a 
violation of the California Constitution by depriving plaintiffs of all economical use of their land. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded the case for determination of an adequate remedy, 
warning the city to proceed in good faith and without stalling tactics. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Courts usually try to avoid acting like super zoning boards. Judges, after all, 
did not go to planning school, as planners did, or win election by the public, as city council members 
did. Sometimes, however, judges get dragged into that role by the constitution—as happened here. 
Whether these lot owners should have had to demonstrate merely that it was safe for them to build 
houses on their own individual parcels, as they apparently were prepared to do, or should have had to 
show that the entire 116-acre zone was safe for construction, as the city wanted them to do, looks like 
a classic land-use issue—one to be decided by either experts and/or politicians, rather than judges. 
But when the effect of this dilemma is that landowners have been denied the ability to build on their 
parcels for over 30 years, the matter acquires a constitutional magnitude that puts it right into the lap 
of the judiciary, forcing those former law students to decide whether there has been a “taking” of 
property without just compensation. 
In this case, the court of appeals seems to have held that its earlier, unpublished decision in this 
litigation compelled the finding that there had been a permanent and total taking of plaintiffs’ property 
(although I confess to being somewhat unable to follow how a conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims came 
within the ripeness futility exception established that the taking was permanent). Once that 
determination was made, the case came within Lucas, shifting the burden over to the city to prove that 
its decision was justified under “background nuisance rules.” Once that burden had been shifted, it 
became easy to say that the testimony of the experts was too conflicting and self-contradictory to 
support a permanent refusal to permit the owners to build their houses on their properties, although 
the conclusions look remarkably similar to the findings that come out of a planning commission or 
related land-use-involved entity. 
Had I been on the planning board or the city council, my concerns about safety and uncertainty 
might well have led me to vote just as they did: Who wants to feel responsible for having permitted 
unsafe structures to be erected? On the other hand, when the experts are split all over the place, and 
no one is likely to get hurt if the house moves except the owners themselves, should I still say no? If I 
am a judge, and both sides have merit, how can I possibly decide? Like Monks I, this decision should 
probably have gone unpublished.  —Roger Bernhardt 
 
